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Gaming and the limits of digital embodiment 
 
Introduction 
This paper discusses the nature and limits of player embodiment within digital games. We 
identify a convergence between everyday bodily actions and activity within digital 
environments, and a trend towards incorporating natural forms of movement into gaming 
worlds through mimetic control devices.  We examine recent literature in the area of 
immersion and presence in digital gaming; Calleja’s  (2011) recent Player Involvement Model 
(PIM) of gaming is discussed and found to rely on a problematic notion of embodiment as 
‘incorporation’. We go on to further reflect on the nature of player involvement in digital 
gaming environments by applying insights from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s  Phenomenology of 
Perception. It is argued that digital embodiment differs so significantly from primordial 
embodiment that any idea of total immersion is simply fantasy.  We subsequently argue that 
digital game media nonetheless provide us with unique opportunities for exploring the nature 
of distinctively human forms of embodiment, and so we need more complete and more 
reliable phenomenological descriptions of the experiences associated with computer games. 
 
Towards Whole-Body Interaction 
The idea that digital environments could provide complete sensory immersion has long been 
a  ‘technofantasy’  of  science  fiction  (Ihde,  2010;;  Gregersen,  2011).    However,  this  remains  a  
regulative ideal and point of orientation for games design, with 3D game worlds becoming 
ever more convincing, haptic technologies more sophisticated, and control interfaces based 
on more natural forms of bodily action.  Video games have also been reaching out to wider 
audiences with more people playing them than ever before.  Juul (2010:5) suggests that part 
of  this  rise  in  popularity  is  due  to  the  use  of  mimetic  interfaces  (where  “the  physical  activity  
that  the  player  performs  mimics  the  game  activity  on  screen”).  By  building  upon conventions 
and activities with which people are already familiar (e.g. swinging a racquet to play tennis) 
games that adopt mimetic interfaces (e.g. swinging the Nintendo Wiimote to play virtual 
tennis) are easier to learn how to use since players are already familiar with how the 
controllers are supposed to work. This reduces the learning curve and lowers the barriers of 
access to those interested in playing these sorts of games.  Similarly, Skalski et al., (2010) 
argue that controllers with more natural mappings allow for players to easily access mental 
models of real-world behaviours and thus facilitating engagement within the game.   
Jenson and de Castell (2008) suggest that the introduction of novel or bespoke games 
controllers such as dancemats, motion sensitive controllers and guitar shaped peripherals 
have contributed to very different forms of game play.  This tendency in game design – and 
this is a trend we also observe in mobile and educational technologies – is twofold.  Not only 
are forms of digital interaction starting to use more (or all) of the body as a control device, 
but human-computer interaction is increasingly based on natural or mimetic forms of 
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movement.  In addition, forms of haptic feedback (notably vibration) are often used to 
promote a sense of embodiment within digital environments.  As Dourish notes, human-
computer interaction has developed through a variety of stages and the latest phase involves a 
shift from graphical interfaces to more tangible, social and embodied approaches. More 
specifically,  this  latest  stage  “draws  on  the  way  the  everyday  world  works”  and  “the ways we 
experience  the  everyday  world”  (Dourish, 2001:17). 
Since the success of the Nintendo Wii, Microsoft (Kinect) and Sony (PS Move) have also 
attempted to utilize motion control. Kinect in particular seems to embrace the notion of 
whole-body interaction by removing the need for a game controller: through an infra-red 
sensor bar and microphone, Kinect is able to track player movements in real time and respond 
to   specific   gestures   and   spoken   commands.   It   has   been   claimed   that   “controller-less 
immersion  has  been  the  Holy  Grail  of  game  designers  and  developers  for  many  years  now”  
(Leyvand et al., 2011:94) though the reviews on sites such as Metacritic indicate that not all 
games are effective at utilising this type of interaction. For example, Kinect Star Wars 
received a Metascore of 55 (and a user score of 3.6 out of 10) with one reviewer stating 
“there’s  nothing  natural  about  Kinect Star Wars.  Whether  you’re  running,  fighting,  flying,  or  
shooting,  the  movements  range  from  decent  to  downright  awkward”  where  “combat  is  even  
less   fun,   with   clumsy   arm   swings   that   never   really   feel   like   you’re   truly   directing   a  
lightsaber”  (Cohen,  2012).    
 
Engagement, Immersion, Embodiment  
Human-computer interactions are increasingly using more (or all) of the body as a control 
device.  Game-play is typically described as an engaging activity, and the move towards 
‘whole-body’   interactive   approaches   appears   to   assume   that   more   ‘embodied’   interactions  
will lead to more engaging and immersive gaming (and learning) experiences within virtual 
worlds. For instance, Bianchi-Berthouze, Kim and Patel (2007) investigate the introduction of 
the latest generation of games consoles  which   “offer   control  devices   that   allow   for   a  more  
natural   type   of   interaction”   (2007:   102).  They   carried   out   two   studies  which   examined   the  
effect of body movement within Guitar Hero. In the first within groups study, players were 
asked to play with a classic game pad controller and with a guitar shaped one. In the second 
study, a between groups design was implemented, where players were either told how to use 
star power (which requires the player to increase their level of movement by tilting the guitar 
controller) or they were not given this information. The authors suggest that body movement 
results   in  higher  engagement  and  mediates   the  player’s  sense  of  presence.  Specifically   they  
argue  the  “full-body  experience”  of  playing  Guitar  Hero  “facilitates the feeling of presence in 
the   digital   environment”   and   helps   to   provide   a   “stronger   affective   experience”   (ibid.). It 
would seem that the trend towards whole-body interaction aims at a more embodied and thus 
more immersive, engaging and enjoyable game-play experience.   
Not all studies demonstrate a relationship between presence and enjoyment, though there 
does seem to be a link between perceived naturalness of the controller and enjoyment (e.g. 
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Skalski et al., 2010). Further, precisely what is meant by ‘embodiment’   within   digital  
environments remains unclear (Bayliss, 2007).  There is a persistent ambiguity within the 
literature   on   virtual   realities   and   games   over   ‘immersion,   engagement   and   presence’  
(McMahan, 2003), since the terms are often used interchangeably (Bayliss, 2007; Calleja, 
2007; 2011) further complicating explanations of how these forms of involvement relate to 
the concept of embodiment.  For instance, Brown and Cairns (2004:1298) suggest that 
players experience involvement on three levels:  “engagement;;   moving   on   to   greater  
involvement  in  engrossment;;  and  finally  total  immersion”.  In  order  for  the  player  to  feel  like  
they are inhabiting a different physical location three criteria must be met:  namely, (i) 
engagement (based on attention); (ii) engrossment (requiring emotional investment or 
‘stakeholding’);;   and   (iii)   immersion   (where   “total   immersion   is   presence”   (ibid., 1299). 
Meanwhile, McMahan (2003) distinguishes immersion as a term which relates to the diegetic 
level (i.e. with respect to the game narrative) and engagement to the non-diegetic  level  (“at  
the level of gaining points, devising a winning (or at least a spectacular) strategy, and 
showing  off   their   prowess   to   other   players   during   the   game   and   afterward,   during   replay.”  
(McMahan, 2003:69). She suggests that both contribute to a sense of presence, where she 
draws  upon  Lombard  and  Ditton’s  (1997:73)  definition  of  presence  as  “the  perceptual  illusion  
of  nonmediation”  (see  also  McMahan,  2003).   
Iacovides (2009) has noted that the confusion  over  the  terms  such  as  ‘immersion’  has  carried  
over into the area of games and learning research, as they are rarely defined explicitly. For 
example,   Gee   describes   games   as   “action- and goal-directed simulations of embodied 
experience”   (2008:254)   suggesting that, during play, the virtual minds and bodies of 
characters   become   the   player’s   surrogate   mind   and   body.   Through   “taking   a   projective  
stance”  (where  the  player  projects  their  own  goals  onto  the  character)  Gee  argues  players  are  
able to engage in a form of embodied thinking which is quite similar to the kinds of problem 
solving and learning people engage in during everyday life. It would seem that games also 
have scope to serve as simulators which support situated learning. But as Bayliss (2007) 
notes,   experiencing   a   “highly   sophisticated   simulation”   – for instance when players are 
“controlling   a   fictional  American   soldier   taking   part   in   the  Normandy   invasion…  does   not  
equate   with   them   actually   storming   a   beach   in   north   western   France”.   The   digitally 
‘embodied’  experience  of  playing   the  game  differs in obvious ways from the experience of 
actually taking part in the Normandy invasion.  The fictional worlds of games like these are 
often not attempts to emulate real life, but to re-create shared cinematic, literary or televisual 
worlds which have no physical correlate.  A player who takes on the role of Cole Phelps in 
LA Noire isn’t  emulating an experience so much as experiencing a story about a fictional Los 
Angeles police department in the 1940s; itself a composite of any number of film noire or 
television shows. Entire game worlds can be fictional; a Skyrim player effectively interacts 
with a complete fantasy   world   through   an   ‘embodied’   avatar.      Conversely,   the   avatar  
controlled by the player may not be recognisably humanoid in form at all (such as the spirit-
wolf from the eponymous Okami, or, more abstractly, the breath of wind in Flower).   The 
extent to which a player can feel embodied in such forms is debatable.  Some avatars are 
evidently   more   human   than   others,   and   manifest   different   forms   of   ‘being-in-the-game’.   
Games allow us a space to be otherwise, to act without consequence and indulge in 
4 
 
behaviours which are unusual for us.  There is a general consensus among designers that 
immersion is achieved through fostering a sense of embodiment.  But if embodiment is the 
right  way  to  conceive  (or  frame)  being  ‘in-the-game’  then  how  might this be promoted?  Is it 
through more natural interfaces / control systems or some other feature?  Research in learning 
technology, for example, suggests that advanced human-computer technology – such as eye-
tracking – can contribute to the design of both gaming and learning environments (San Diego 
& McAndrew, 2009).  While the ability to collect data like this is important, such 
investigations   must   be   tempered   with   an   understanding   of   the   subject’s   own   conscious  
experience.      If   a   sense   of   immersive   ‘being’   in   a   game   is   rather   something   that   can   be  
promoted by the convincingness of our experience of a digital world, what would be 
characteristic of such experiences?    
 
The  ‘Player  Involvement  Model’  (PIM) 
We have argued that the language of embodiment is often used in unclear or inconsistent 
ways in gaming research literature.  Calleja (2007; 2011) also argues that there remains some 
confusion  of  how  these  terms  are  used.  In  particular,  the  use  of  the  “metaphor  of  immersion  
as deep absorption [has become] conflated with a metaphor of immersion as traversable space 
habitation”   (Calleja,  2007:94). As an alternative he presents the Player Involvement Model 
(PIM), based on qualitative research, which seeks to replace the metaphor of immersion with 
one of incorporation (Calleja, 2011).  
In   Calleja’s   model,   the   term   incorporation   is   used   signify   how   the   digital   environment   is  
made   present   to   the   player’s   consciousness   though   a   process   of   internalising the relevant 
kinaesthetic, ludic, affective, narrative, spatial and shared frames which simultaneously allow 
the player to exert agency within the digital world and appear present to others within it. 
Incorporation   is   defined   as   “the   subjective   experience of inhabiting a virtual environment 
facilitated   by   the   potential   to   act   meaningfully   within   it   while   being   present   to   others”  
(Calleja, 2011:219; Calleja, 2007).1  This model of involvement emphasises how different 
forms of engagement can contribute a powerful game-play experiences which involve a 
combination of deep absorption and the sense of inhabiting a virtual environment.  Further, 
Calleja  argues  that  “incorporation  operates  on  a  double  axis:   the  player  incorporates  (in  the  
sense of assimilation or internalization) at the same time as being incorporated (in the sense 
of   corporeal   embodiment)   through   the   avatar   in   that   environment”   (Calleja,   2011:211;;  
Calleja, 2007).  Drawing upon the experientialist ontology of Lakoff and Johnson (2003), 
Calleja (2011: 168) states that this process of internalization and  experiential  restructuring  “is 
compelling  precisely  because  it  draws  so  strongly  from  everyday  life”.   
The PIM suggests that the sensation of inhabiting a virtual world is dependent on the player 
feeling embodied within that world, though it is worth noting that this does not necessarily 
                                                          
1 It’s  worth  noting  that  the  PIM  was  developed  on  the  basis  of  data  gathered  from  MMORPGs,  perhaps  
indicating an awareness of intersubjectivity for creating meaning in games. Perhaps only MMORPGs offer the 
kind of meaning-generating interactions that could reasonably justify the label of intersubjectivity, though this is 
a claim that we will not examine in any detail in this paper. 
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mean   the  experience  will   be  one  of   ‘deep’   involvement  or   enjoyment.  As Bayliss (2007:5) 
argues, “though  the  sense  of  ‘being  there’  may  seem  to  be  a  direct  experience of the game-
world for the sufficiently competent player, it is intrinsically mediated by the complex 
relationship between the player and their locus of manipulation, a relationship based on the 
distinction between embodiment as a state of being and embodying  as  an  act.”  The  distinction  
between  “embodiment  as  a  state  of  being”  and  “embodying  as  an  act”  (adapted from Hirose) 
is used to frame the various ways in which the player experiences the game world of their 
avatar through a kind of enacted embodiment.  Familiarity with a game world is developed 
through extending  one’s  intentionality  to  the  actions  of  the  avatar  and  appreciating  the  limits  
of their agency within the game environment.  Thus, Bayliss (2007:5) argues that we should 
understand embodiment as a form of meaningful enactment which is facilitated by physical 
actions which mimic the digital actions being portrayed (e.g. accelerate, brake, steer) which 
improve a sense of immersion within a game. 
In  Calleja’s  work this distinction emerges as the provision of a dual aspect for explaining 
what  he  terms  ‘incorporation’  as  (i)  a  sense  of  assimilation  of  a  virtual  environment  into  the  
conscious experience of the player and (ii) the systematically upheld embodiment of that 
player into a single location within the game world (the avatar) (2011:169).  Calleja’s  
advocacy  of  the  term  ‘incorporation’  appeals  directly  to   the  language  of   the  lived  body, yet 
any sense of incorporation in the former sense is by proxy.  It is assimilation rather than 
incorporation.  Calleja’s  PIM  does  not  so  much  solve  the  problem  of  digital  embodiment,  but  
suspends the issue.  The focus of the model is instead on distinguishing a number of discrete 
elements of player involvement (kinesthetic, spatial, shared, affective, narrative, ludic) and 
perhaps understanding embodiment as a phenomenon which might arise from some 
combination of these depending on the game (Calleja, 2011:43-45).    This schema is helpful 
in providing a robust analytic framework with which to understand and describe the 
experience of gameplay, but does little to show the ways in which such experiences relate to 
an alternative sense of embodiment or an assimilated environment .  While Bayliss refers to 
this sense of embodiment as a kind of action, Calleja stills relies on the metaphor of spatial 
and  imaginative  ‘extension’  into  game  worlds  through  the  avatar  (2011:181).     But even if we 
accept the Baylissian notion of intentionality projected into a digital avatar as a form of 
embodiment, it remains important to distinguish this from primordial or originary 
embodiment. There remains a fundamental ontological and phenomenological difference 
between acting vicariously through an avatar in order to have an approximate experience of 
their form of embodiment and the way we experience embodiment in our daily lives.  While 
his focus is not so much on embodiment itself, but on modelling the experience of gameplay, 
Calleja’s notion   of   ‘incorporation’   as assimilation does not appear to address the 
philosophical problems provoked by digital embodiment.   
It   should   be   noted   that   we   do   not  mean   to   imply   that   Calleja’s   treatment   of   this   complex  
question is in any way superficial.  Early on in his book (Calleja, 2011:27) he approaches the 
problem   of   the   ‘immersive   fallacy’   as   framed   by   Salen   and   Zimmerman   (2003:450-453), 
noting that several writers have conflated the idea of more immersive experiences with more 
meaningful or more enjoyable forms of game play and advancing the interesting thesis that a 
schism between technological-psychological understandings of digitally mediated experience 
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as presence and humanistic understandings of such experiences as immersion may be the root 
of  the  problem.    Calleja’s  proposal undoubtedly shows sensitivity to this problem.  However, 
he does not provide a satisfactory solution.  
 
The Phenomenology of Embodiment 
While the PIM recognizes some of the philosophical misconceptions that are found in the 
discourse around gaming and human-computer   interaction   (HCI)   it’s   evident   that   there  
remains further work to be done to develop the right kind of concepts and language for 
understanding new forms of digital interaction.  In the rest of this paper we will be concerned 
with the extent to which phenomenology – widely understood as the rational study of 
conscious experience – can help in this endeavour. 
Since the mid-1990s (after a short-lived media interest in virtual reality technologies) 
specialists in HCI have tried to provide rich and thorough phenomenologies of user 
embodiment with a view to rendering digital worlds more plausible and immersive (e.g. 
Murray, 2000).   While there are a number of phenomenologists whose work may shed light 
on the experience of gaming, there are a number of reasons for focusing on Merleau-Ponty in 
relation to the issue of digital embodiment. Merleau-Ponty’s  work   is   also   a focal point in 
Dourish’s  (2001)  influential  book  on  the  philosophical  basis  of  computer  interaction  (where  a  
whole chapter is devoted to discussing the phenomenological tradition).  Clark similarly 
draws on Merleau-Ponty to argue against representationalist paradigms in cognitive science 
and the philosophy of mind (1997:148).  More recently, Crick (2011) has returned to 
Merleau-Ponty’s  text  in  order  to  propose  a  phenomenological  model  of  bodies  within  games  
based   on   Sobchak’s   (2004)   account   of   the   phenomenology of the body in film.  Merleau-
Ponty’s   analysis   is   of   particular   interest   with   reference   to   the   experience   of   being   ‘in   the  
game’   because   of   his   emphasis   on   the   centrality   of   the   body   and   the   embodied   nature   of  
human experience: Phenomenology of Perception attempts a radical re-description of the 
nature  of  conscious  experience  which  steers  a  course  between  empiricist  and  ‘intellectualist’ 
(Neo-Kantian) positions on the relationship between mind and body (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:28).  Merleau-Ponty argues that human subjectivity is embodied, meaning that being a 
human means being in a world which cannot be reduced to any kind of solipsistic interiority.  
For Merleau-Ponty, our perceptual relationship to the world – our consciousness – is not a 
transcendental act, but an interpretation of bodily stimuli.  This is expressed in the 
irreducibility of the Gestalt, and the fact that the world enjoys a privileged place in our 
perception by its very appearance.  Thus, our perception of our own being is embodied and 
there   is   no   ‘view   from   nowhere’   (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:60-61).  The objects of perception 
(including  one’s  own  body)  have  an  inner  horizon  in  consciousness and an outer horizon in 
the  external  world.    This  ‘horizon’  is  temporal  and  future-focused (Merleau-Ponty, 1964:21).  
However, our ability to experience the world results from our form of being-in-the-world 
[être au monde] and specifically from the body, which experiences sensory information and 
enables  us  to  have  a  place  in  “a  world  of  implicit  relations  and  movements”  (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962:148).  Faithful descriptions of experience are, for Merleau-Ponty, vague and often 
disordered.  Nonetheless, the self is always embodied:   “at   every  moment   living,  breathing,  
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feeling,  suffering  (being  affected),  changing  and  decaying”  (Carlisle,  2006:19).    Contra  Crick  
(2011) digital avatars are inevitably embodied in ways significantly different to our own form 
of  being.    Digital  forms  of  ‘embodiment’  are  never  primordial. 
 
Interfacing Bodies and Game Worlds 
Dreyfus (1996) identifies three different aspects to embodiment in Merleau-Pontian thought, 
each of which contributes to our understanding of our own experience of embodiment and 
helps build an intersubjective account of how our bodies are understood by others. The first is 
physical; the partaking of physical (and distinctively human) form.  The second relates to the 
network of physical abilities and skills we are motivated to develop through our life 
experiences.  The third relates to the background understandings of embodiment we arrive at 
through being members of cultural lifeworlds with other embodied beings.  Each of these 
aspects is predicated on the preceding features, which we can represent in the following way.   
 
 
 
Our contention is that these three aspects of human embodiment – as developed in Merleau-
Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception – can help to bring clarity to the complex question of 
embodiment in digital games.  We deal with each of them in turn. 
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(I)  Physical 
One of the distinctive things about being a human being is that we cannot touch ourselves or 
others without becoming aware of our own corporeality, our capacity to be touched (Merleau-
Ponty, 1968:147).  Indeed, the reversibility of touching and being-touched are what 
distinguishes living objects from inert matter which can only be sensed and not sense.  Put 
another way, the human body can be both the organ or perception and the object that is 
perceived.  This dual-aspect of touching and being-touched [touchant-touché] is part of the 
primordial experience of human subjectivity (Merleau-Ponty, 1964:92) and characteristic of 
the  ‘ontology  of  the  flesh’  more  generally  construed  (Slatman,  2005). 
Embodiment is often understood in terms of its opposition to representation: the immaterial 
mind   ‘opposes’   the   material   body   (Ihde,   2010:11-15).  The fact that bodies within game 
worlds cannot conform to this duality is a good illustration of the fundamentally 
asymmetrical nature of digital embodiment. Consider the example of pain: we never 
experience the physical pain of a wounded avatar; only a representation of it (whether a 
diminishing health bar, a shuddering controller, or blood streaking across the screen).  
Regardless of the particular form of representation (or amelioration) non-digital forms of 
embodiment are ontologically and epistemologically prior to digital experiences.  Rhetoric 
about digital forms of embodiment often overlooks this.  Crick (2011:267) for example 
overstates  his  case  when  he  writes  that  “like  our  lived  phenomenological  experience,  roaming  
a   virtual   game   world   is   a   fully   embodied,   sensuous,   carnal   activity”   on   account   of   an  
aesthetic convergence between the game body and the cinematic body.  We do not relate to 
bodies in virtual worlds (or in cinema for that matter) in the same way that we relate to our 
own corporeality.  For one thing, we tend not to care too much about dying and we do not 
experience pain through our avatar:  these phenomena are experienced as representation, not 
as  embodied,  subjective  experience.    In  this  light,  the  ways  in  which  players  are  ‘embodied’  
within game environments are so unlike our everyday form of embodiment that we might 
question whether this kind of language is appropriate at all. 
 
 (II) Intentionality 
To accept the idea that our consciousness can be embodied in digital environments is tacitly 
to claim that the interfaces which make this possible can be successfully integrated into the 
experience.  We are typically unaware of our clothes, spectacles or false teeth because these 
kinds of technologies are often in prolonged contact with our bodies.  According to Grosz, 
(1994:80)  “anything  that  comes  into  contact  with  the  surface  of  the  body  and  remains  there  
long enough will be incorporated into the body image”.      For   a   convincing   and   immersive  
experience, one should be more or less unaware of the way in which it is being mediated.  
Along these lines, Merleau-Ponty encourages us to ask: how do we perceive the body?  How 
successfully can we incorporate technology into our perception of the body?  Merleau-Ponty 
uses the car as an example of successful polymorphism of this type:  a familiar vehicle is car 
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is  an  “area  of  sensitivity”  which  extends  “the  scope  and  active  radius  of  the  touch”  (Merleau-
Ponty, 1962:143).   
Mimetic game interfaces are designed to facilitate this sense of polymorphism through 
incorporation of controllers and avatars into the phenomenological body.  The extent to 
which   control   devices   and   game   stimuli   can   effectively   become   ‘invisible’   forms of 
amelioration between the subject and a digital game world is the degree to which they can 
support more immersive gaming experiences.  Game control systems should strive to be as 
‘invisible’   as   possible,   phenomenologically   speaking,   if   they   are   to   promote immersion.  
Technologies and interfaces which involve using more of the body than just the hands – or 
even do away with controller altogether – to interact with digital worlds do not necessarily 
promote   a   sense   of   ‘embodiment’.         In  Heideggerian   parlance, control devices need to be 
‘ready-to-hand’   [Zuhandenheit], mediating objects which are their most effective when we 
become unaware of them as mediating objects (for an overview see Winograd & Flores, 
1986).      We   can   understand   this   as   a   rationale   for   ‘whole   body’   approaches   to   human-
computer interaction which strive to do away with control devices completely.2 
 
(III) Worldliness 
Human forms of embodiment as being-in-the-world [être au monde] are inevitably bound up 
with practical context.  As social beings, we always find ourselves in a particular cultural and 
historical context that determines our basic orientation towards the world.  Once again 
following Husserl (1936), Merleau-Ponty argues that to be embodied is to be part of a shared, 
intersubjective, lifeworld [Lebenswelt] which is the source of meaningful activity.  Game 
worlds are not necessarily meaningful in themselves, however.  Block puzzle games like 
Tetris or PuyoPuyo might  present  visually   coherent   representations  of   space  but   there’s  no  
intrinsic meaning to be found in destroying blocks.   
The recent smash hit Skyrim (2011) might seem to be a contender for a game that 
successfully conveys a meaningful lifeworld.  After all, players experience a highly 
customisable character from a first person perspective who freely roams a detailed and 
interactive world.  Character choices lead to outcomes which are portrayed through 
convincing visual and audio effects (like damage, being poisoned, etc.).3  There are hundreds 
of characters to interact with and an overarching narrative which has been painstakingly 
crafted.  Yet the game has been criticised for lacking any convincing sense of consequences 
to actions.  As Scimea, reflecting on his experiences of exhausting dialogue options with a 
minor character writes: 
I finally realized the problem I was having with Skyrim: It felt soulless. I may 
as well have killed Agnis and taken her stuff, because what did it matter 
                                                          
2 Heidegger’s  terminology  has  become  established  within  HCI  discourse,  though  there  is  a  tendency  (e.g.  
Dourish, 2001:139) to understand the concept of being ready-at-hand as an abstract property or state rather than 
a seamless aspect of conscious experience.   
3 These may work quite well, but there are other proprioceptive aspects of embodied sensory experience which 
could never conceivably be reproduced within digital environments as we know them: gravity, heat, etc. 
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whether she was there or not? I suspected that nothing I did would ever matter, 
and that has been  my  experience  as  I’ve  progressed  through  the  game.  Skyrim  
is a huge world drawn with a level of detail that entices us to lose ourselves 
there, and is filled with things to do, enough to keep us occupied probably for 
years. But it also feels empty and pointless. (Scimea, 2011) 
Some games clearly do aspire to portray meaningful worlds within which the avatar is 
embodied, with differing degrees of success.  Heavy Rain and the Mass Effect series, for 
example, emulate aspects of the experience of freedom by presenting detailed worlds with 
convincing characters and storylines where the paths of action chosen by the protagonist(s) 
may be morally ambiguous and (crucially) have lasting consequences.    
But perhaps it is only through play with other humans that games become meaningful.  
Consider this excerpt from the Edge annual awards which named Dark  Souls   ‘Best Online 
Experience’:   
Dark Souls profoundly  understands  online  play’s  defining  feature: humanity. 
Though   there’s   an   in-game mechanic that shares the name (a typically deft 
touch, blending concept and lore), the focus is always on others. Dark  Souls’ 
multiplayer runs alongside its single player, but not always in parallel: 
asynchronous messages left for you offer hints or tricks, while bloodstains and 
ghosts flicker in and out of reality. The key is its tightly controlled feature set: 
with no voicechat and no friends, this lonely world is kept permanently lonely. 
(Edge, 2011)  
Curiously – and perhaps even paradoxically given the way that this title relies on online 
multiplayer elements – it is a sense of loneliness, alienation or angst in the imperfection or 
asymmetry of relations with others that appears to afford this title its appeal.  A more 
immersive or convincing sense of embodiment within digital worlds may thus depend on 
experiencing a convincing, meaningful world within which the player has an elevated sense 
of choice and responsibility.  As Dreyfus (2009:120) argues, virtual environments such as 
Second Life (and presumably games) do not provide the same experiences as those within the 
“risky,  moody   real   world”.  Worlds that are convincing are also worlds in which we have 
something at stake.  As Heidegger famously argues, human being is fixed and embedded in 
the world which manifests itself as meaningful through the existential attitude of care or 
concern [Sorge]:  there is no such a thing as a human being that has no interests.  Thus, it is 
“only   emotional,   involved,   embodied   human   beings” (Dreyfus, 2009:47) that have the 
capacity to behave in authentically human ways.  
 
Conclusion: Singing The Body Digital? 
We began this paper by referring to the techno-utopian fantasy of complete embodiment in 
digital worlds, a vision of digital mediation which is predicated on the possibility that a 
digital game could be so immersive that there would be no way for the player to know that 
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they were in a game.  We have used Merleau-Ponty’s   phenomenology   of   embodiment   to  
suggest that we need to expand the description of embodiment to include a wider sense of 
being.  Game designers interested in promoting embodiment may wish to strive towards 
producing virtual environments that involve reflexivity at the level of the body, seamless and 
holistic forms of interaction, and more meaningful game worlds. 
While the idea of a totally immersive experience is fundamentally fallacious, the drive 
towards the techno-utopian fantasy of total immersion may make sense in terms of a need to 
provide authentic experiences that allow for transfer between virtual and real worlds. 
However, such approaches ultimately miss the point, particularly when it comes to the kind 
of entertainment provided by gaming. Part of the enjoyment of watching a horror film or 
playing a soldier in a first person shooter may stem from the very fact that these experiences 
do  indeed  differ  from  what  they  would  be  in  the  “risky,  moody  real  world”  where  we  are  
much more vulnerable: it is arguably our lack of embodiment that forms the basis of the 
appeal. The distance between our bodies and the activities that occur on screen is important to 
maintain and attempts to replicate our embodied experiences of the real world are in danger 
of overlooking this.  
This is not to imply that game-play cannot be meaningful in itself, or that it is unable to 
inspire reflection and creativity. The analysis we have provided rather suggests that photo-
realistic graphics and whole body controllers are not the only component of what can make 
game-play immersive (or enjoyable) and in this we clearly agree with Calleja (2011). 
Designers should focus more on narratives, consequences and shared interactions if they want 
to create game-play experiences that are thoroughly engaging and rewarding.  In this light , it 
may be more useful to think about ways in which games can be different to the real-world 
and the opportunities they afford. Instead of trying to replicate our day to day experience of 
embodiment, games provide a medium in which we are able to explore and extend our 
notions of what it means to be a human being that can act in both real and virtual worlds.  
This will require more complete (and more reliable) phenomenological descriptions of such 
experiences; more empirical data about the physiology and psychology of immersion; and 
improved ways of thinking and speaking about the experience of gaming.  We hope to have 
shown that Merleau-Ponty’s  work  provides a useful resource and starting point in such an 
enterprise. 
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